The Trap Gets Worse

Five Questions from Sunday’s Briefing That Reveal Why Trump Cannot Escape the Escalation Trap—and Why Instability Now Favors Tehran

For the past ninety days, Washington has been obsessed with a single question: will President Trump and Iran reach a nuclear agreement?

That is no longer the most important question.

The more important question is whether instability itself is becoming the new normal – and worse a source of power that benefits Iran.

That possibility sat at the center of Sunday’s live briefing and represents the next stage of the Escalation Trap framework I have been developing throughout this war.

The Escalation Trap occurs when a state wins tactical victories while its strategic position deteriorates. Leaders then face a dilemma. They can accept the political consequences of strategic failure, or they can escalate further in the hope that victory remains just over the horizon.

President Trump achieved genuine tactical successes during the opening phase of the war. Iranian facilities were struck. Senior leaders were killed. Important military assets were damaged.

Yet Iran still possesses its nuclear materials. Iran still retains missiles and drones. Most importantly, Iran emerged from the bombing campaign with increased leverage over the Strait of Hormuz, the world’s most important energy chokepoint.

The danger is not that America is losing battles.

The danger is that America is winning battles while becoming strategically weaker.

At the same time, the world economy continues moving toward an inventory cliff. With Hormuz disrupted, global energy markets have increasingly relied on drawing down finite oil inventories. Most professional estimates place the point of serious stress sometime between mid-July and early August. Once inventories approach operational minimums, markets become extraordinarily sensitive to disruption.

Yet neither side has capitulated, producing the negotiating deadlock we see today.

That brings us to the next step in the argument.

If instability generates bargaining leverage, weakens rival coalitions, and shifts regional alignments, then instability itself becomes a strategic resource.

Iran may not simply be enduring instability.

Iran may increasingly be benefiting from it.

That possibility generated five outstanding questions during Sunday’s discussion.

1. Does Instability Create a Fourth Center of World Power—or a More Fragmented World?

My answer remains largely unchanged from before the war.

Iran is still on track to emerge as a fourth center of world power.

What has changed is my understanding of the pathway.

Historically, rising powers accumulated influence through economic growth, military expansion, or territorial conquest. Iran appears to be pursuing something different. Instead of controlling territory, it is increasingly shaping the strategic environment around it.

The evidence is already visible across the Gulf. Since the war began, several Gulf governments that historically depended on Washington have quietly encouraged accommodation rather than confrontation. Regional leaders have openly expressed doubts about America’s ability to provide long-term security while simultaneously pushing for negotiations.

This is exactly what realism predicts.

When confidence in the security guarantor declines, smaller states begin hedging.

Iran does not need to control the Gulf.

It increasingly benefits from the world’s fear that it might.

Its long-term objective is not conquering neighboring states. Its objective is becoming the dominant strategic actor in the Gulf while gradually weakening the American-led security architecture that has existed since the end of the Cold War.

The Age of Instability is not replacing power politics.

It is creating a new pathway through which power can be accumulated.

2. If Instability Helps Iran, Why Would Iran Ever Want Lower Oil Prices?

The short answer is that it probably does not.

Before the war, roughly 20 million barrels of oil passed through Hormuz every day, representing about one-fifth of global consumption and roughly one-quarter of all seaborne oil trade. No other maritime chokepoint has comparable significance.

The key issue is not simply oil flows.

The key issue is uncertainty.

History repeatedly shows that markets recover far more slowly than diplomats sign agreements. Insurers, shipowners, and traders often remain cautious long after formal understandings are reached. Confidence returns gradually. Uncertainty lingers.

That dynamic benefits Iran.

Iran certainly bears economic costs from prolonged instability. But those costs must be compared against the leverage instability creates.

Higher oil prices increase pressure on Washington.

Higher oil prices increase pressure on America’s Gulf partners.

Higher oil prices increase pressure on Europe and the broader global economy.

Most importantly, they increase pressure on negotiators to make concessions that would have been politically impossible under normal conditions.

Washington appears focused on uranium.

Tehran increasingly appears focused on leverage.

Those are not the same thing.

3. Is There Still a “Declare Victory and Leave” Option?

I do not believe so.

Many observers assume President Trump could simply announce success, sign an agreement, and move on.

That would require something much larger than a diplomatic declaration.

It would require a genuine American withdrawal from the Gulf.

Naval deployments would need to shrink dramatically.

Regional military forces would need to be reduced.

The network of American bases throughout the region would need to be scaled back.

Anything less would preserve the confrontation under a different label.

The United States has spent decades building military infrastructure in the Gulf because the region sits astride the world’s most important energy chokepoint. Great powers do not voluntarily abandon strategic positions of that magnitude.

Historically, major withdrawals occur only after prolonged military, political, or economic pressure. The Soviet retreat from Eastern Europe remains one of the clearest modern examples.

The United States is nowhere near that point.

Which means the incentives pushing Washington back toward involvement remain largely intact.

4. What Could Trigger the Next Escalation?

The single most dangerous trigger is a summer gasoline crisis.

Many analysts assume economic pain automatically generates pressure for restraint.

History often shows the opposite.

After 9/11, Americans did not demand restraint.

They demanded action.

When populations experience sustained pain, leaders frequently face pressure to respond rather than retreat.

If gasoline prices rise sharply during July or August, many voters may not conclude that America should disengage from the conflict.

They may conclude that America should do more.

That possibility is precisely why I continue watching oil inventories so closely.

The danger is not simply economic disruption.

The danger is the political reaction to economic disruption.

5. Why Can Negotiations Increase Pressure for Military Action?

Many people assume negotiations and military action are opposites.

Historically, they often occur simultaneously.

The United States negotiated while continuing military operations in Vietnam.

Diplomacy and coercion overlapped during Bosnia.

They overlapped again during Kosovo.

During the Kosovo campaign, NATO negotiated continuously while simultaneously expanding its air campaign over seventy-eight days in an effort to improve its bargaining position.

This should not surprise us.

Negotiations rarely eliminate underlying conflicts of interest. They simply create another arena in which those conflicts are contested.

When leaders believe bargaining leverage is shifting against them, the temptation to use military force often increases rather than decreases.

That is why I discussed the categories of targets particularly closely. As long as those targets exist, opportunities for renewed escalation remain.

This is one reason I increasingly expect the next thirty days to follow a pattern that receives remarkably little attention in current commentary:

Bombing while talking – a continuation and worse of the US-Iran exchange of attacks over the weekend.

The next escalation may occur because negotiations fail.

It may also occur because negotiations are proceeding too slowly for one side’s political needs.

The Bigger Point

All five questions point toward the same conclusion. They all build on my detailed presentation of why to expect over the next 30 days in the live briefing, where I laid out not just the bottom lines but the mechanisms of instability favoring Iran, specific near-term implications and concrete indicators of what to track to see if these expectations are occurring. The full video is of course available to paid subscribers.

The central issue is no longer whether escalation occurs.

The central issue is whether instability becomes self-sustaining.

If instability continues generating leverage, shaping negotiations, fracturing alliances, influencing energy markets, and creating recurring opportunities for military action, then the future of the Iran war will not be defined primarily by whether negotiations succeed or fail.

It will be defined by whether instability itself becomes durable.

If that happens, the most important legacy of this war will not be the bombing campaign, the negotiations, or even the confrontation over Iran’s nuclear program.

It will be the emergence of a new strategic reality.

A world in which instability itself becomes the new normal -- because it is increasingly a source of geopolitical power.

And if that world emerges, the Age of Instability will outlast the war that created it.